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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Ephrata, Pennsylvania community hospital discharged
Pierce Nye from its mental ward, few people suspected that he planned
to invade the nation’s nuclear infrastructure. But on February 11, 1993,
he crashed his Plymouth station wagon through two fences and into the
“protected area” of Three Mile Island in what the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) at that time labeled “the most serious intrusion on
record in this country.”1 In the wake of this intrusion and the World
Trade Center bombing of the same year, the public and the government
recognized the need to upgrade security at the nation’s nuclear power
plants. 2 In 2001—following the terrorist attacks in New York and

1 Matthew L. Wald, Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1993, at A16. The “protected area” of a nuclear power plant is an area guarded by
physical barriers that is accessible only by official personnel, vehicles, and materials. 10
C.F.R. § 73.55 (2011).
2 See The World Trade Center Bombing, The Three Mile Island Intrusion and the
Potential Threat to U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean
Air and Nuclear Regulation of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d Cong. 1
(1993) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation); Protection Against
Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. part 73) (increasing security at nuclear facilities following the
World Trade Center bombing and a vehicular incursion at Three Mile Island).
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Washington, D.C.—the NRC considered the threat of an airborne attack
on the nuclear infrastructure, and modified its security requirements
accordingly. 3 Following the 2001 attacks, however, many states,
organizations and private citizens began to demand that the NRC account
for the possible environmental effects of a terrorist attack on a nuclear
power plant or nuclear fuel storage facility as part of its licensing
process.4 Though the NRC, an administrative agency, typically rejected
such demands, a split between the Ninth and Third Circuits, reviewing
the decisions of the NRC, has pushed this issue into the national
spotlight.
In 1974, Congress established the NRC to promote the civilian use
of nuclear power while protecting the public and the environment from
its potentially harmful effects. 5
Since its inception the NRC has
designated security and the environmental impacts of its facilities among
its top priorities.6 As part of the licensing process, the NRC provides a
forum for private citizens to address their concerns and participate in the
construction and licensing of nuclear facilities. 7 The National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires federal agencies to
establish a procedure for examining the significant environmental

3 See, e.g. Security Zone, San Diego, CA, 67 Fed. Reg. 5480 (Feb. 6, 2002)
(codified at 33 C.F.R. part 165) (establishing a temporary security zone in the waters
immediately adjacent to the San Onofre (Cal.) nuclear generating station); Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR §
2.206, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,467 (Nov. 22, 2002) (stating that the NRC has partially granted a
request for a security upgrade in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but
finding that the existing emergency response plans are sufficient to respond to a terror
event); Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately), 67 Fed. Reg. 65,150 (Oct. 23,
2002) (modifying license requirements for nuclear fuel storage facilities following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, specifics of which were not released to the
public, but supplement the existing requirements enumerated in 10 C.F.R. § 73.55); All
Operating Power Reactor Licensees; Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately),
67 Fed. Reg. 9792 (Mar. 4, 2002) (modifying license requirements for nuclear generating
stations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, specifics of which were not
released to the public, but supplement the existing requirements enumerated in 10 C.F.R.
§ 73.55).
4 See generally N.J. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561
F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007); Private Fuel
Storage L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002).
5 About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://nrc.gov/about-nrc.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
6 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2023 (2006); Energy Reorganization Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879 (2006) (creating the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 10
C.F.R. § 51.10 (2011).
7 JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI, THE STATE AND NUCLEAR POWER: CONFLICT AND CONTROL
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 76 (The University of Washington Press, 1984).
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impacts of their actions. 8 One requirement of this procedure is the
publication of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)—a detailed
written report that discusses the significant environmental impacts of a
proposed federal action.9 The satisfactory preparation and disclosure of
an EIS by the NRC fulfills the “twin aims” of NEPA: (1) “to inject
environmental considerations into the [NRC]’s decisionmaking process,”
and (2) “to inform the public that the agency has considered
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”10 Opponents of
nuclear power frequently challenge the thoroughness of the NRC’s
compliance with NEPA by claiming that the NRC failed to adequately
review a particular environmental impact in its EIS.
In a 2002 administrative decision, Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.,11
the NRC responded to growing concerns for plant security by addressing
the issue of whether the threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is
an environmental effect to be considered in the construction, licensing,
and operation of a nuclear power plant or fuel storage facility, as
required by NEPA.12 Opposing the licensing of a nuclear fuel storage
facility, the state of Utah claimed that a nuclear facility’s EIS must
discuss the potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on that
facility.13 The NRC held that the environmental impact of a terrorist act
on a nuclear plant is not a factor subject to EIS analysis because (1)
consideration of terrorism conflicts with NEPA’s goals and the rule of
reason, 14 (2) the NRC cannot adequately determine the risk of an
attack,15 (3) NEPA does not require analysis of a “worst case scenario,”16
and (4) NEPA’s public process is an inappropriate forum for review of
sensitive security issues.17
8 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006)
(declaring it to be federal policy “to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,” and
establishing a procedure for agencies to examine the significant environmental impacts of
its actions).
9 40 C.F.R § 1502.1 (2011). The EIS is generally preceded by an environmental
assessment that is a concise document that provides evidence and analysis “for
determining whether to prepare an [EIS] or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9 (2011).
10 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981).
11 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002).
12 Id. at 340.
13 Id. at 345.
14 Id. at 348–50.
15 Id. at 350–51.
16 Id. at 351–54.
17 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354–57.
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The Ninth Circuit departed from the NRC’s Private Fuel Storage
precedent in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,18 when it held that an EIS must address the environmental
consequences of a terrorist attack on the proposed nuclear facility. 19
Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,20 affirmed the NRC’s decision that an EIS does
not need to include a terrorism review.21 With its decision in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit created a
circuit split between itself and the Ninth Circuit regarding whether the
NRC must consider the threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility in
an EIS for a nuclear power plant or nuclear fuel storage facility.22
Part II of this Comment discusses the purpose of NEPA, relevant
Supreme Court precedent, and the law according to the Third and Ninth
Circuits in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and
Mothers for Peace, respectively. Part III offers an analysis of the circuit
split in light of the binding law and regulatory framework. It also
explores the ramifications of following either circuit’s approach and
presents possible courses of action that address issues raised by this
debate. This Comment concludes by arguing that the Third Circuit in
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection correctly resolved
this issue by holding that an EIS need not include a discussion of
terrorism as an environmental impact of a nuclear facility.
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Civilian Use of Nuclear Power
President Eisenhower initiated the “Atoms for Peace” program
shortly after his inauguration in 1953.23 The aim of this program—to
transfer nuclear technology from the military to civilian enterprises—
vested the development of nuclear energy in private companies.24 The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 25 (AEA) established the Atomic Energy
Commission (“AEC”), which regulated all aspects of private nuclear
18
19
20
21
22

2009).

449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1035.
561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 142.
New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 554 n.1 (2d Cir.

23 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 997 (3d 2010).
24 Id.
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2023 (2006).
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energy.26 The Energy Reorganization Act of 197427 abolished the AEC
and placed the regulatory and licensing authority of the AEC within the
newly established NRC, while the Energy Research and Development
Administration (the predecessor to the Department of Energy) retained
the AEC’s research and development functions.28
The public initially approved of the use of nuclear power when the
first commercial plant opened in 1957.29 But growing fears about the
risks of nuclear power resulted in new safety requirements and more
complex procedures for plant licensure.30 Despite the legal process the
NRC provided for citizen participation, some interested parties have
preferred a more direct approach. For example, in May 1977, the
Clamshell Alliance, a New England-based coalition of anti-nuclear
groups, coordinated the first forceful occupation of a nuclear plant in the
United States at New Hampshire’s Seabrook plant, which resulted in the
arrests of 1,414 protestors.31 Similarly, four years later, police arrested
1,453 protesters at California’s Diablo Canyon when demonstrators tried
to block land and sea access to that plant.32
The growing public concerns proved to be legitimate in 1979 when
a series of mechanical malfunctions at Three Mile Island produced the
“nation’s worst nuclear accident.”33 The release of radioactive materials
into the water and air during the Three Mile Island meltdown
demonstrated that serious accidents present a material threat to the
environment and illuminated the potential harmful consequences of
nuclear power. No longer was a major incident merely hypothetical; one
had actually occurred. Without appropriate measures by the NRC,
accidents would likely occur again.34 The NRC responded by studying
the risk of future accidents and its ability to protect the public and the

26 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 23 at 997–98; Our History, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2011).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5879 (2006).
28 Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 343
(Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 13th ed. 2008).
29 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 998.
30 Id.
31 Id.; Arrests at Diablo Canyon Pass Total at Seabrook, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981,
at A16.
32 Arrests at Diablo Canyon Pass Total at Seabrook, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981, at
A16.
33 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 655–56 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations
omitted) (describing the Three Mile Island incident, its causes, and effects).
34 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 741
(1983).

2011] BETWEEN NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR TERROR

229

environment from them. Ultimately, the NRC implemented appropriate
changes to its evacuation and disaster management plans.35
In the early 1990s, several incidents throughout the nation either
directly or indirectly implicated the NRC’s security duties. For example,
the truck bombings of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City
Federal Building in 1993 and 1995, respectively, demonstrated the active
and actual threat of land-based terrorist attacks to valuable installations.
Additionally, Pierce Nye’s invasion of Three Mile Island further
demonstrated the vulnerability of the nation’s nuclear industry.36 These
events, in addition to the protestor demonstrations at Seabrook and
Diablo Canyon, illustrate the difficult task faced by the NRC in
safeguarding the nation’s nuclear infrastructure.
In recent years, the issue of terrorism has dominated the discourse
on plant security and environmental risks. Until 1993, Americans
generally considered terrorism to be an act that occurred abroad.37 The
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, 38 however,
revealed a weakness in American domestic security and reignited a
twenty-year-old debate on the vulnerability of nuclear facilities. 39
Following the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.,40 the
debate again intensified. Design-based requirements of nuclear plants in
susceptible areas require that they be built to withstand hurricanes and
earthquakes. 41 Prior to 2001, however, no design-based mandates
existed that required nuclear plants to be able to withstand large aircraft
crashes.42 In 2001, the NRC began an intensive review of the designbased requirements at nuclear facilities and implemented increasingly
stringent design-based and physical security standards. 43 The NRC’s
scrutiny generally looks beyond the possibility of an attack or invasion
35

Id.
Matthew L. Wald, Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1993, at A16.
37 Hoffman, supra note 2.
38 Robert D. McFadden, EXPLOSION AT THE TWIN TOWERS: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, § 1, at 1.
39 Hoffman, supra note 2.
40 Serge Schmemann, U.S. ATTACKED: President Vows to Exact Punishment for
‘Evil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.
41 MARK HOLT & ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34331, NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES 4 (2010).
42 Id.
43 See sources cited supra note 3; San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2006). But see Riverkeeper, Inc.
v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing an environmental protection
group’s demands that New York’s Indian Point nuclear generation plant be protected by a
ten mile radius no-fly zone and defenses sufficient to defend this zone from an
approaching aircraft).
36
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and examines all potential environmental harms, including tsunamis,
floods, and tornadoes.44 The NRC refuses, however, to require nuclear
facilities to assess the hypothetical effects of terrorism as an articulable
environmental hazard.45
B. The NRC’s Obligations Under NEPA
The AEA grants the NRC the exclusive authority to regulate the
safety of nuclear facilities and charges the NRC with ensuring that “the
utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord
with the common defense and security and will provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public.”46 To achieve this end,
the NRC may promulgate rules, regulations, and orders, “as the
Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common
defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or
property.”47 Examples of the NRC’s compliance with this duty pervade
its NEPA-enforcing regulations,48 its physical protection requirements49
and its plant licensing procedures,50 to name a few.
Passed in 1969, NEPA established “a broad national commitment to
protecting and promoting environmental quality.” 51 Through NEPA,
Congress declared a national policy intended to foster the productive and
harmonious coexistence of man and nature, and to fulfill the nation’s
present and future social and economic needs. 52 Agencies implement
this policy through a series of “action-forcing” procedures that require

44 See, Fact Sheet on Seismic Issues for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fsseismic-issues.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011); Dina Cappiello & Matthew Daly, Wolf
Creek plant not entirely twister-proof, THE WICHITA EAGLE, May 27, 2011, available at
http://www.kansas.com/2011/05/27/1866781/wolf-creek-plant-notentirely.html#storylink=misearch; A.G. Sulzberger & Matthew Wald, Flooding Brings
Worries Over Two Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A19; Tom Zeller, Jr.,
U.S. Nuclear Plants Have Same Risks, and Backups, as Japan Counterparts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2011, at A10..
45 See Amergen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 126–29 (2007); Private Fuel Storage,
L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 344–46 (2002).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2006).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (2006).
48 10 C.F.R. pt 51 (2011).
49 10 C.F.R. pt 73 (2011).
50 10 C.F.R. pt 2 (2011).
51 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989).
52 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). NEPA also established the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), which promulgates regulations interpreting NEPA and guides agencies in
determining which actions are subject to an EIS. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4341–4357 (1970)
(establishing the purpose, duties, jurisdiction and structure of the CEQ).
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the agencies to take a “hard look”53 at the effects of their actions on the
environment and to disseminate the relevant information to the public. 54
In short, NEPA serves two paramount aims: (1) to require the federal
agency to discuss environmental issues in its decision-making process,
and (2) to assure the public that it has adequately discussed
environmental considerations.55
The completion and public disclosure of an EIS ensures that the
NRC complies with its duty to serve NEPA’s twin aims.56 Pursuant to
NEPA, the agency responsible for any major federal action that will
significantly affect the human environment must draft a detailed EIS. 57
The EIS must assess the environmental impact, unavoidable adverse
consequences, and alternatives to the federal action. 58 Major federal
actions in the NEPA context are those projects that will likely produce
substantial environmental effects and that are subject to federal
management and responsibility. 59 “Effects” includes “[d]irect effects,
which are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place[,]”
and “[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable.”60
Agencies must evaluate remote, but potentially significant impacts
providing the evaluation remains grounded in “existing credible
scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably
53 Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n. Comm’n, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (describing the function of the court
in reviewing administrative decisions as assuring “that the agency has given reasoned
consideration to all the material facts and issues[,]” and stating that where the agency has
given the facts and issues a hard look, the court should uphold the agency’s findings).
54 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350
(1979) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976)).
55 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981).
56 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
57 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
58 Id. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The EIS process requires the applicant (the party
applying to construct a nuclear facility) to submit to the NRC its own “environmental
report,” presenting its assessment of the environmental impact of the planned facility and
possible alternatives that would alter the impact. The NRC will then consider the
applicant’s report and prepare its own “detailed statement” of environmental costs,
benefits and alternatives. The statement then circulates among interested parties and
agencies and is made available to the public, who will provide comments on the
statement. The NRC then prepares a final statement and makes final recommendations
on the application. When construction is completed, the applicant must repeat the
process to obtain an operating license. Id. at 1128.
59 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011).
60 Id. at § 1508.8.
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foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment.” 61
Instead of extending the theoretical limit of the EIS to a “worst case”
analysis, the Statement must focus on “reasonably foreseeable impacts”
of the proposed action. 62 The “reasonably foreseeable” requirement
serves the aims of NEPA by directing the agency’s resources at those
issues of greatest concern to the public and the agency, rather than
misleading the public by focusing on highly speculative and distracting
risks.63
C. Challenges to the NRC’s Environmental Review
Passed in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
provides a generic process for agency rule-making64 and a private right to
judicial review of agency actions. 65 It also provides six separate
standards by which a circuit court may hold an agency action unlawful.66
A court may not overturn an agency decision merely because it is
unhappy with the ruling. 67 Rather, the APA ensures that the agency
follows its procedures and that the agency decision is not arbitrary or
capricious.68 So long as the agency takes a “hard look” at the federal
action’s environmental consequences, a court will not supplant the
61

40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2011).
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989). Prior to
1986, where “information relevant to the agency’s evaluation of the proposed action
[was] either unavailable or too costly to obtain, the agency [was required to] include in
the EIS a ‘worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its
occurrence.’” The CEQ removed this requirement because the “worst case” requirement
overemphasized highly speculative harms, prompted agencies to exceed the rule of
reason in their analysis of potential impacts, and proved wasteful of agencies’ time and
resources, thus diverting the EIS process from its intended purpose. Robertson, 490 U.S.
at 354 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22; National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 50
Fed. Reg. 32,237 (proposed Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22)).
63 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 356 (citing National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,624–15,625 (Apr.
15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22); National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,237 (proposed Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
1502.22)).
64 5 U.S.C. § 551–59 (2006).
A specific agency’s enabling act may provide a
different process for rulemaking, and may preclude or channel judicial review. In the
case of the Atomic Energy Act, the APA provides the relevant administrative and judicial
procedures. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2231, 2239(b) (2006).
65 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). No private right exists, however, where review of the
action is barred by law or the action is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5
U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
66 5 U.S.C. § 706.
67 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1980).
68 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375
(1989); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S 402, 413–14 (1971).
62
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agency’s expert judgment with its own.69 Despite the broad deference
courts give to federal agencies, opponents of nuclear energy frequently
challenge the NRC’s decisions, claiming that it has not sufficiently
fulfilled its NEPA obligations. A few landmark cases brought by such
interveners provide the historical and legal background to this issue.
1. Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy
When Metropolitan Edison, the owner of Three Mile Island, sought
to re-license the plant after the 1979 meltdown, opponents of nuclear
power and of the re-licensing intervened and the case quickly found its
way to the Supreme Court. The Court analyzed NEPA and the EIS
requirements in what became a landmark decision for subsequent
litigation concerning the sufficiency of EISs. In Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,70 the Court ruled that an EIS must
address a particular factor if (1) the factor is the type of effect
proximately caused by the federal action,71 and (2) the factor is the type
of effect that Congress intended an EIS to address under NEPA.72
When completing an EIS, federal agencies must consider the
particular effects of the agency’s proposed action that share a close
causal relationship with that action. Metropolitan Edison equated this
relationship to proximate causation in tort law. 73 Mere “but-for”
causation will not bring an effect within NEPA’s scope if a causal chain
is too attenuated. 74 In the case of re-licensing Three Mile Island, the
psychological effects that some residents and relatives of residents might
suffer were too remote from the physical change that would result from
continued production of energy, such as the release of low-level radiation
and increased fog due to the plant’s cooling towers.75
Thus, the Court in Metropolitan Edison read “environmental effect”
and “environmental impact” in NEPA to include a “reasonably close
causal relationship between (1) a major federal action (re-licensing Three
69 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98
(1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The decisions that agencies make require
evaluation of complex issues by experts with a high level of technical expertise. “When
specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the
reasonable opinion of its own qualified experts even if . . . a court may find contrary
views more persuasive.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377–78; see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412;
Balt. Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103.
70 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
71 Id. at 773–75.
72 Id. at 776–77.
73 Id. at 774.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 774–75.
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Mile Island); (2) a change in the physical environment (the risk of a
nuclear accident); and (3) an effect (potential damage to psychological
health). 76 When a hypothetical effect does not have a close causal
connection to the physical environment, NEPA does not require its
inclusion in an EIS.77 Setting the stage for future discussions of what
falls within NEPA’s mandate, the Court held that both tort law and
NEPA require courts to “look to the underlying policies or legislative
intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes
that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”78
With respect to the potential environmental impact of terrorism and the
scope of an EIS, where to draw that “manageable line” became a
contentious issue.
The scope of an EIS must remain manageable in order to ensure a
thorough and fully-informed decision. 79 After the Three Mile Island
meltdown, the NRC concluded that the risk of an accident had not
changed since the publication of the original EIS in 1972.80 Even after a
serious accident had occurred, finding that the risk of an accident had not
changed was not an “arbitrary and capricious” decision. Metropolitan
Edison came to this decision by contemplating the purpose of NEPA and
the congressional intent and policies of the Act. The Court held that
Congress did not intend NEPA to address the effects of accidents that
occurred in the past, nor does its language or legislative history suggest
that the occurrence of an accident could broaden the Act’s scope. 81
Thus, the occurrence of a unique or traumatic incident does not
automatically render that type of incident an “effect” or “environmental
impact” required as part of an EIS. 82 This limit on NEPA’s scope,
coupled with proximate cause, provides guidance for its future
interpretation.
2. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii
Notably, the year before it decided Metropolitan Edison, the
Supreme Court issued a decision in a non-NRC case involving the
requirements of an EIS.
In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 83 a coalition of environmental
76

Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 775.
Id. at 778.
78 Id. at 774.
79 Id. at 776 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1980)).
80 Id. at 775, n.9.
81 Id. at 779.
82 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 778.
83 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
77
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protection groups demanded that the Navy produce a “hypothetical EIS”
for nuclear weapons that may or may not have been stored in a facility
located on the island of Oahu.84 The Navy published a “candidate”‘ EIS,
detailing the environmental hazards associated with storing, handling and
transporting nuclear weapons, but did not disclose the facility’s
location.85 The Court rejected the petitioners’ demand for a hypothetical
EIS because such a requirement clearly departs from the NEPA
requirement that provisions in the EIS be “reasonably foreseeable.”86
The Court discussed the need to balance the goals of NEPA with
national security. Under the Totten doctrine,87 “public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated.”88 Thus, an EIS that reveals information sensitive to national
security, such as the location of nuclear weapons, may not be disclosed
to the public.89 Additionally, because the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) governs disclosure under NEPA,90 an EIS deemed “classified”
pursuant to an executive order may be withheld from public disclosure.91
Therefore, the NRC could withhold from the public an EIS that has been
classified or that discusses details of possible risks of terrorism.
3. Private Fuel Storage
The NRC first rejected the requirement to address terrorism in an
EIS in early 2002 after interveners claimed that in light of recent terrorist
attacks, the EIS should “consider the environmental consequences of
terrorists flying a fully-loaded commercial jumbo jet into the [Private
Fuel Storage] facility.” 92
In Private Fuel Storage, an NRC
administrative decision, the state of Utah claimed that recent terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington D.C. made future attacks upon a

84

Id. at 140.
Id. at 141–42.
86 Id. at 144.
87 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
88 Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146–47 (quoting Totten, 92 U.S. at 107).
89 Id. at 146–47.
90 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
91 Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46.
92 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 345 (2002). The NRC decided this
case concurrently with three other cases raising similar terrorism-related issues. Id. at
343. The discussion in Private Fuel Storage became the binding rationale for these and
subsequent terrorism-related cases. See also Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, 55 N.R.C.
158 (2002); Dominion Nuclear Conn., 55 N.R.C. 161 (2002); Duke Energy Corp., 55
N.R.C. 164 (2002).
85
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Utah nuclear fuel storage facility more likely. 93 The Commission
addressed the issue by asking whether contemplation of the
environmental impact of terrorism would serve the twin aims of NEPA.94
An obligation to evaluate the risk of terrorism as an environmental
factor, it noted—unlike reasonably certain effects on foliage and wildlife,
water and air quality, and human culture and lifestyle—is unpredictable,
“comes in innumerable forms and at unexpected times and places. . . .
[a]nd is not a natural or inevitable byproduct of licensing[.]”95 Ruling
that an EIS need not include a discussion of terrorism, the NRC stated
that such a requirement would provide no practical benefit to the
Commission, the environment, or the public for four primary reasons.96
First, NEPA review requires contemplation of “reasonably
foreseeable” impacts, 97 a requirement referred to as the “rule of
reason.” 98 The rule of reason does not demand examination of every
conceivable effect of a project. “Remote and speculative” impacts,
“worst case” scenarios, “impacts with . . . a low probability of
occurrence,” or effects too attenuated from the federal action to fall
within the range of proximate cause do not require NEPA analysis. 99
The rule of reason serves as the manageable line between likely effects
of licensing and those that are “too attenuated to require a NEPA review,
particularly where the terrorist threat is entirely independent of the
facility.”100
Second, the Commission noted that the risk of attack on a particular
facility is not quantifiable, and that any attempt to quantify the risk
would be speculative, and thus would fail the rule of reason.101 Even if
the risk could be quantified, the Commission stated, it would be
miniscule and thus fail the rule of reason. 102 Moreover, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the United States intelligence community, law
enforcement agencies, and the Department of Defense all take active
93

Private Fuel Storage, 340 N.R.C. at 345.
Id.
95 Id. at 347.
96 Id. at 347–48.
97 Id. at 348 (citing Wyoming Outdoor Council, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d
43, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1st Cir.
1996); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1993); Private Fuel Storage, 56
N.R.C. 340 at 348.
98 Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 760 F.2d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Private Fuel Storage,
56 N.R.C. at 348 (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
99 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 345 (internal quotations omitted).
100 Id. at 350.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 351.
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steps to protect nuclear facilities and their respective local airspace.103
These efforts, coupled with the existence of many other inviting targets,
place the risk of environmental effects arising from acts of terror well
outside the scope of the rule of reason.104
Third, the Commission equated the contemplation of the effect of a
terrorist attack to a “worst case” scenario analysis. Both the Council on
Environmental Quality and the Supreme Court expressly rejected the use
of the “worst case” scenario analysis.105 The risk of a terrorist attack on
a nuclear plant, the NRC admitted, amounts to a “theoretical possibility,”
that falls short of the “reasonably foreseeable” threshold for NEPA
review. 106 Supplanting a “reasonably foreseeable” analysis with a
“theoretically possible” discussion would essentially revive “worst case”
analysis, and could harm the public by unduly exaggerating a project’s
risks.107
Finally, the Commission recognized the need to keep sensitive
information out of the hands of those who might use it to do harm, and
that NEPA’s public nature conflicts with this national security interest.108
NEPA itself contains a limiting provision, stating that the means utilized
to achieve its aims must abide by “considerations of national policy,” and
that it should exercise restraint “based on ‘risk to health and safety, or
other undesirable and unintended consequences.’”109 In addition to these
general limits in NEPA, the AEA forbids the NRC from disclosing
security-related information. 110 Based on these four factors, the NRC
refused to require nuclear plant operators to conduct a terrorism analysis
within an EIS.
D. The Circuits Address the Risk of Terrorism
1. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission: The Ninth Circuit Rejects Private Fuel Storage
In San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS must take into account
103

Id.
Id.
105 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354–55 (1989)
(discussing the CEQ’s abandonment of the “worst case” scenario analysis); see also
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information,
51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22).
106 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 352.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 354.
109 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006); Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355.
110 42 U.S.C. § 2161 (2006); Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C.at 355–56.
104
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the potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear
facility.111 In December 2001, only months before the NRC’s decision in
Private Fuel Storage, Diablo Canyon—located on California’s Pacific
coast—applied for a license to construct and operate a dry cask storage
facility. 112 Because Diablo Canyon’s original storage capacity was to
expire in 2006, the plant could not continue to operate without the
additional facility.113 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, a Californiabased organization concerned with dangers associated with the Diablo
Canyon plant, intervened in the license board proceeding, urging the
board to deny the license because the NRC’s environmental review did
not discuss the environmental effect of sabotage or a terrorist attack.114
In September of 2002, Mothers for Peace submitted a second petition for
hearing on the effect of terrorism, expanding its challenge to include the
security of the entire Diablo Canyon facility.115 The Commission denied
their petitions under the precedential ruling of Private Fuel Storage.
Subsequently, Mothers for Peace appealed to the Ninth Circuit.116 The
Ninth Circuit rejected each of the four bases of the Private Fuel Storage
decision, resulting in the first successful challenge of Private Fuel
Storage and setting a binding standard on nuclear facilities located within
the Ninth Circuit, requiring facilities to provide for the environmental
impact of a terrorist attack.117
Instead of relying on the Supreme Court’s “reasonably close causal
relationship” standard,118 the Ninth Circuit applied its own holding in No
GWEN Alliance, Inc. v. Aldridge, which held that an EIS need not

111 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d
1016, 1035 (3d Cir. 2006).
112 Id. at 1021. Dry cask storage consists of a stainless steel canister, filled with spent
fuel, welded shut and enclosed in concrete “overpacks” that allow circulating air to cool
the fuel.
113 Id.
114 Pacific Gas & Elec., 56 N.R.C. 413, 447 (2002).
115 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1023.
116 Id. at 1024. Agencies have the discretion to use adjudicative proceedings to
establish binding legal norms. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 203 (1947). Because the NRC established binding legal rules in Private Fuel
Storage, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision as a legal rule, instead of a factual
finding, which would receive greater deference. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1027.
117 Id. at 1035; Tri-Valley Cares v. Dep’t of Energy, 203 Fed. Appx. 105, 107 (9th
Cir. 2006); Tri-Valley Cares v. Dep’t of Energy, No. C 03-3926, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29437 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2007); see also Areva Enrichment Serv., L.L.C., 70 N.R.C. 1,
5–6 (2009) (recognizing and applying the exception to the NRC’s judgment, which
Mothers for Peace carved out as binding on facilities located within the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction).
118 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 778 (1983).
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address “remote and highly speculative consequences.”119 The court then
held that the NRC’s determination “that terrorist attacks are ‘remote and
highly speculative,’ as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the
government’s efforts and expenditures to combat this type of terrorist
attack against nuclear facilities.”120 Because the NRC had recently taken
steps designed to combat or mitigate the potential of a terrorist attack, the
court reasoned, the NRC did not consider terrorist attacks so “remote and
speculative” as to escape NEPA review.121 Neither did the Ninth Circuit.
Having addressed the Supreme Court’s causation standard, the
Ninth Circuit then assessed the remaining Private Fuel Storage factors.
The court observed that the second factor—stating that the risk of
terrorism falls outside the rule of reason due to its highly speculative
nature122—misses the point.123 Instead, the court stated that no NEPA
provision, NRC regulation, or any other authority, case law, or policy
statement allows the NRC to ignore an unquantifiable risk.124 Rather, an
agency enforcing NEPA must take a “hard look” at the environmental
consequences, even if they are unquantifiable.125
The third Private Fuel Storage factor states that NEPA does not
require a “worst case” scenario analysis.126 The Ninth Circuit in Mothers
for Peace treated this factor as a red herring. The NRC removed “worst
case” review from its requirements in 1986 due to their speculative,

119 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030; No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v.
Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988). No GWEN Alliance held that an EIS for a
military-use radio microwave tower network need not discuss the threat of nuclear war
that the network itself might provoke. No Gwen Alliance, 855 F.2d at 1386. The Ninth
Circuit argued that the causal chain of Metropolitan Edison did not control because that
case examined the requirement of an EIS in considering a physical change in the
environment and its subsequent psychological effect, whereas No GWEN Alliance
involved a federal action and the subsequent change in the physical environment. Id. at
1385. Instead of following Metropolitan Edison, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an EIS need
not address “remote and highly speculative” effects, and in language echoing
Metropolitan Edison, stated that “the nexus between construction of [the tower network]
and nuclear war is too attenuated to require discussion of the environmental impacts of
nuclear war in an [EIS].” Id.
120 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030. Examples of such efforts and expenditures
by the NRC include bolstering security at its facilities, upgrading its security policies, and
establishing the office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. Id. at 1030–31.
121 Id. at 1031.
122 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. 340, 348–49 (2002).
123 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1033–34.
124 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting in part) (relying on Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 754 (3d Cir. 1983)).
125 Id. at 1032.
126 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 352.
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wasteful and ambiguous nature.127 Because that “worst case” analysis is
not required, the court believed that the NRC “wrongly labels a terrorist
attack the worst case scenario . . . .”128
Finally, the court dismissed the fourth Private Fuel Storage factor,
which examines whether the disclosure of sensitive national security
information would increase security risks. 129 The court relied on the
Supreme Court’s determination in Weinberger, that information that
implicates national security may not be disclosed through NEPA’s
processes, and explained that exempting classified information from
disclosure in an EIS would not fail NEPA’s mandate because the public
would not be prohibited from contributing to the hearing process. 130
Thus, after rejecting, but not overruling, the Private Fuel Storage
decision, the Ninth Circuit held that an EIS must take into account the
potential environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility.
2. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: The Third Circuit
Reaffirms the NRC’s Approach
In direct opposition to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Mothers for
Peace, the Third Circuit held in New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, that a nuclear plant’s EIS need not contemplate terrorist
attacks as a potential environmental threat. The New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection challenged the 2005 application of
AmerGen Energy Company, the owner and operator of Oyster Creek
nuclear generating station, for “the NRC’s failure to prepare an [EIS] to
study the effects of an aircraft attack on Oyster Creek.”131 The NRC
agreed with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s finding “that
terrorism and ‘design based threat’ reviews . . . lie outside the scope of
NEPA in general and of license renewal in particular.”132 In rejecting the
127 National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22
(2011).
128 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1034–35.
131 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 135
(3d Cir. 2009).
132 AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 128–30 (2007) (finding a possible
hypothetical act caused by a criminal actor to be too far removed from the natural or
expected consequences of re-licensing Oyster Creek; moreover, “a NEPA-driven review
of the risk of terrorism would be largely superfluous . . . given that the NRC has
undertaken extensive efforts to enhance security . . .” and numerous practical obstacles
prevent meaningful NEPA review of the issue).
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appeal from the NRC’s decision, the Third Circuit discussed the claim’s
“two insurmountable flaws.”133 First, that the requisite “reasonably close
causal relationship” between the environmental effect and the federal
action in the EIS statement did not exist between Oyster Creek’s relicensing and the risk of a terrorist attack; second, that the Department of
Environmental Protection’s demand for NEPA-terrorism review was
redundant and provided no meaningful analysis of the issue of
terrorism.134
The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Metropolitan Edison, which required the court to “draw a manageable
line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible
for an effect and those that do not.”135 The court also found support for
its position in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,136 which
states that an agency need not prepare an EIS for actions, the effects of
which lie beyond that agency’s control and responsibility. 137 In both
Metropolitan Edison and Public Citizen, the “manageable line” appears
to encompass the boundaries of an agency’s area of control.138 Similarly,
the Third Circuit cited to Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 139 in which the
Second Circuit denied an intervener’s request for a no-fly zone and antiaircraft defenses surrounding a New York nuclear power plant, as they
were protective measure beyond the province of the NRC.140 Likewise,
the Third Circuit denied the requirement for NEPA review of terrorism
because the NRC’s inability to combat terrorism beyond its physical
borders placed the matter outside of its control and in the hands of
another agency.141 The fact that the NRC has taken precautionary actions
133

N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 136.
Id.
135 Id. at 139, (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S.
766, 774, n.7 (1983)).
136 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004).
137 Id.; see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139.
138 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011)
(“Major Federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which are
potentially subject to [f]ederal control and responsibility.”) (internal quotations omitted).
139 359 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
140 Id. at 161–68 (rejecting Riverkeeper, Inc’s claim that the NRC abdicated its
statutory duty to protect the public health and safety because the agency is best situated to
determine how its resources are allocated, and noting that the heightened level of
protection required of the NRC is in no way “absolute protection” of nuclear plants).
141 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139 (stating that the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Department of Defense respond to the threat of terrorism).
Additionally, though not mentioned by the Third Circuit, the mission of the Department
of Homeland Security is to “(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B)
reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage,
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States[.]”
6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006).
134
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to protect nuclear plants from terrorism does not bring the possible
environmental effect of terrorism within the scope of a “reasonably
foreseeable causal relationship.”142
The court also expounded on Metropolitan Edison’s suggestion that
causation as precipitated by a federal action parallels tort law’s
proximate cause. 143 Discussing the concept of intervening and
superseding causes, the court determined that a criminal or terrorist act is
a superseding cause that places the effect of terrorism farther from the
licensing of the plant. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts such
effects cannot be anticipated. 144 Ultimately, a successful attack on a
nuclear plant involves two superseding causes: (1) the criminal actions of
a terrorist, and (2) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration and
the Department of Defense to protect the facility.145 These superseding
causes place the environmental effect of a terrorist attack beyond the
“manageable line” of effects that an EIS must address.146
Additionally, the court reasoned arguendo that even if required
under NEPA, the NRC’s generic EIS 147 is not required to analyze the
effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack. 148 According to the EIS
prepared for Oyster Creek, “should the unlikely event occur, the effects
would be ‘no worse than those expected from internally initiated
events.’” 149 This generic analysis, the court found, was sufficient to
satisfy the hard look requirement of an impact, the risks of which “are
142 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (referencing Ground Zero Ctr. for NonViolent Action v. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2004)).
143 Id. at 140.
144 “An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another
after the actor’s negligent act or omission has been committed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 441(1). “A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which
by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 440. An intervening force resulting from a third person’s act or failure to act,
or a wrongful act of a third person towards the other is an “important consideration in
determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 442.
145 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 141.
146 Id. at 140–41.
147 To streamline the environmental review process, the NRC has examined ninetytwo environmental issues common to all nuclear power plants and has resolved sixty nine
of them in a Generic EIS. Id. at 134. The remaining twenty-three issues are analyzed on
a plant-specific basis by the applicant in its Supplemental EIS. Id. at 134; see also Notice
of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License Renewal of
Nuclear Power Plants and To Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,209 (June 3,
2003).
148 Id. at 143.
149 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (discussing the Generic EIS from Oyster
Creek’s initial licensing); see also 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011).
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impossible to quantify but nonetheless [may be characterized] as
‘small.’”150 Because an EIS, under Metropolitan Edison, does not need
to consider an impact that is not reasonably foreseeable, such as
terrorism (despite the fact that the Oyster Creek generic EIS inherently
considered these effects), specific analysis of the environmental impact
of a terrorist attack would be meaningless and need not be conducted.151
III. THE RISK OF TERRORISM IS NOT AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
“The purpose of an EIS is to inform the decision-making agency
and the public of a broad range of environmental impacts that will result,
with a fair degree of likelihood, from a proposed project . . . .” 152
Knowledge of this information allows the agency to make a decision that
considers all relevant factors and the effects of its action.153 An EIS that
contains misleading information does not accomplish these goals.
Likewise, information contained in an EIS that diverts the agency’s
attention and resources from the reasonably foreseeable effects of its
actions to those that are merely speculative and hypothetical does a
disservice to the twin aims of NEPA.154 Such an EIS skews the ability of
both the public and the agency to properly evaluate the consequences of
the federal action. By requiring nuclear facilities to conduct a detailed
environmental analysis in an EIS for an issue as undefined, distracting,
and speculative as terrorism, the Ninth Circuit’s holding not only fails to
serve the purpose of NEPA, but it also creates public safety risks;
violates Supreme Court precedent; and places an inefficient,
unmanageable, and unattainable burden upon the NRC and plant
operators.

150

N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 143.
Id. at 144.
152 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 347 (2002).
153 Id.
154 Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv, 421 F. 3d 797, 811 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Inaccurate economic information may defeat the purpose of an EIS by “impairing
the agency’s consideration of the adverse environmental effects and by skewing the
public’s evaluation of the proposed agency action.”) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 235 F. Supp. 2d
1143, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (“An EIS that relies upon misleading economic
information may violate NEPA if the errors subvert NEPA’s purpose of providing
decision-makers and the public an accurate assessment upon which to evaluate the
proposed project.”).
151
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A. Metropolitan Edison Places the Risk of Terrorism Beyond the Scope
of NEPA Review
The Ninth Circuit disregarded precedent established by the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison. The Supreme Court stressed the
importance of proximate cause analysis and established the necessary
chain of three events: (1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the
physical environment; and (3) an effect. The Ninth Circuit interpreted
Metropolitan Edison as standing for the principle that the effects of a risk
do not produce an environmental impact, but that the mere risk of harm,
if the harm occurs, will produce an environmental impact. However, by
distinguishing the risk of an event from the occurrence of that event,
Metropolitan Edison in no way suggested that the causal relationship
between an event and an environmental effect, and between the risk of an
event and an environmental effect, would be any different. On the
contrary, in describing the chain with respect to Three Mile Island—the
federal action (re-licensing the plant), the physical change (the perceived
risk of nuclear accident), and the effect of that change (potential damage
to psychological health)—proximate cause analysis was pervasive and
pivotal.155 The mere risk of an accident was so attenuated from the relicensing of Three Mile Island that the claimed environmental impact—
psychological stress—fell well beyond the manageable line of effects of
the federal action. The Ninth Circuit’s “quick look” misapplied
Metropolitan Edison; causation under NEPA must begin with a federal
action and end with an environmental effect.156
Certain other environmental laws do not employ proximate
causation to limit the range of effects that the EIS must discuss. Where a
statute requires only but-for causation, it states this expressly. Likewise,
where no alternative standard to proximate cause is laid out, proximate
cause is the rule. Consider, for example, the Clean Air Act. 157 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the Clean Air Act,
and under EPA regulations, the emissions caused by a federal action are
those “that would not otherwise occur in the absence of the [f]ederal
action.”158 The Supreme Court in Public Citizen stated that this explicit
language amounts to a requirement for “but-for” causation.159 The Third
Circuit recognized that in order for a standard other than proximate cause

155
156
157
158
159

Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 (1983).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
40 C.F.R. § 93.152 (2011) (emphasis added).
Dep’t of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 772 (2006).
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to apply, the law must establish that alternative standard. 160 NEPA
establishes no alternative standard of causation; thus Metropolitan
Edison requires proximate cause analysis.161
In Mothers for Peace the Ninth Circuit also ignores the legislative
intent discussed in Metropolitan Edison. 162 NEPA requires an
assessment of the impacts of future events; it “does not create a remedial
scheme for past federal actions.”163 Metropolitan Edison developed its
EIS “in the wake of a traumatic nuclear accident,”164 but no provision of
NEPA or regulation promulgated by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) or the NRC allows for the expansion of NEPA’s scope in
the wake of any kind of accident. Just as the Supreme Court in 1983 did
not allow the events of 1979 to redefine “environmental effect,”165 the
Ninth Circuit should not have allowed the events of 2001 to redefine the
same term today. Additionally, Congress nowhere indicated an intent to
give the NRC the duty to prepare an EIS for factors beyond its control, as
the NRC “cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’” of the
criminal acts of terrorists.166
The Ninth Circuit further erred by applying its own “remote and
highly speculative” standard from No GWEN Alliance, which essentially
paraphrased and restated Metropolitan Edison’s “reasonably close causal
relationship” standard. 167 Mothers for Peace, however, interpreted
“remote and highly speculative” as a new causation standard, which it
applied in lieu of Metropolitan Edison.168 Metropolitan Edison did not
leave room in its decision for circuits to apply their own standards due to
minor factual differences. By supplanting the judgment of the Supreme
Court with its own, the Ninth Circuit violated Metropolitan Edison.
160 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 139
(3d Cir. 2009).
161 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 775.
162 Id. at 779.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 778.
165 Id.
166 See Dep’t of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
167 Compare Metro Edison, 460 U.S. at 774 (reading section 102 “to include a
requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical
environment and the effect at issue. This requirement is like the familiar doctrine of
proximate cause from tort law.”), with No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v.
Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385–86 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]his court has also rejected the
notion that every conceivable environmental impact must be discussed in an EIS . . . . An
impact statement need not discuss remote and highly speculative consequences . . . .
[T]he nexus between construction of GWEN and nuclear war is too attenuated to require
discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear war in an . . . [EIS].”).
168 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d
1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006).
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B. The NRC is not Able to Evaluate the Environmental Impact of
Terrorism
After the 2001 attacks on Washington D.C. and New York, the
NRC began to review its security protocols and made a number of
significant changes to respond to the threat of terrorism. 169
The
Commission’s administrative decision in Private Fuel Storage based its
conclusion in part on its scientific and industrial expertise, which
deserves great deference.170 The Third Circuit properly deferred to the
expertise of the NRC, while the Ninth Circuit supplanted the agency’s
judgment with its own. Mothers for Peace refused to defer to the
expertise of the NRC on the grounds that “the NRC’s position that
terrorist attacks are ‘remote and highly speculative,’ as a matter of law, is
inconsistent with the government’s efforts and expenditures.” 171 The
Ninth Circuit erred. The government undertook certain efforts in order
to manage on-site safety, as required by law,172 but it did not and could
not undertake to address an issue as large and complex as terrorism.
The effects of terrorist acts do not fall within the province of the
NRC merely because it has taken steps to prevent or mitigate the acts
themselves. Terrorism is a global issue within the jurisdiction of
particular branches of the government. The NRC is legally and
practically suited to address on-site safety and security and direct health
hazards, and to mitigate environmental impacts that concern the
operation of the plant—terrorism is not within its ambit. 173 Neither
NEPA nor the AEA mandate a counterterrorism mission, nor require the
NRC to consider the result of independent third-party terrorist acts.
NEPA requires the NRC only to conduct an examination of the effect of
the plant or fuel-storage site on the environment, ranging from the
minute to the catastrophic, regardless of any superseding or intervening
cause. 174 By considering the entire range of possible environmental
effects of a nuclear plant in a generic EIS, the NRC fulfilled its
169

See sources cited supra note 3.
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(stating that reviewing courts should defer to the policies and predictions made by
agencies within their own special area of expertise).
171 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d
1016, 1030 (3d Cir. 2006) (mentioning the steps taken by the NRC to combat terrorism
and arguing that these efforts indicate an attitude that terrorism should be discussed).
172 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 (2011) (outlining the purpose and scope of the NRC’s
physical protection provisions); 10 C.F.R. § 73.26 (providing for protection of nuclear
materials in transit); 10 C.F.R. § 73.46 (providing for protection of nuclear facilities); 10
C.F.R. pt. 73, app. B (establishing detailed requirements and procedures for safety
enforcement).
173 See sources cited at Id.
174 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011).
170
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obligations under NEPA; indeed, in doing so, the NRC inherently
contemplated the effects of terrorism. The particular acts of terrorism
themselves are best left to agencies with the expertise to analyze this
potential threat.
C. A Terrorism Assessment will Endanger the Public
“The public aspect of NEPA processes conflicts with the need to
protect certain sensitive information.” 175 The NRC’s responsibilities
include “protect[ing] sensitive information from falling into the hands of
those with malevolent intentions.”176 Yet, an EIS that requires disclosure
of the environmental impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant
would threaten national security by allowing potential terrorists to access
information that could facilitate their malevolent intentions. CEQ
regulations require agencies to furnish their EIS to any person who
requests it.177 Contrary to the requirement that NEPA not subject people
to risk or undesirable or unintended consequences, 178 “[a] full-scale
NEPA process [that considers terrorism] necessarily would require
examination of not only how terrorists could cause maximum damage
but also of how they might best be thwarted.” 179 The NRC has
recognized that keeping this kind of information secret is vital:
[T]he public interest would not be served by inquiries at NRC
hearings and public meetings into where and how nuclear
facilities are vulnerable, how they are protected and secured, and
what consequences would ensue if security measures failed at a
particular facility. Such NEPA reviews may well have the
perverse effect of assisting terrorists seeking effective means to
cause a release of radioactivity with potential health and safety
consequences.180

The AEC, predecessor to the NRC, rejected the requirement that the
regulatory hearing process consider the possibility of attack on a plant by
the country’s Cold War enemies.181 Without an order from Congress or a
175 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006) (declaring the policy of the AEA to protect public health,
safety, and common defense and security); see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56
N.R.C. 340, 354 (2002).
176 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354.
177 40 C.F.R § 1502.19 (2011).
178 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006).
179 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (No. 06-466), 2006 WL 2826275.
180 Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 354–55.
181 Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778, 780–84 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(limiting the participation of an intervener to the licensing proceedings of a nuclear
power plant based on fears that it would become a target for attacks by hostile nations,
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statement of congressional intent, the AEC refused to bring such issues
into the scope of its licensing process,182 stating that “to impose such a
burden would be to stifle utterly the peaceful utilization of atomic energy
in the United States.”183 NEPA is limited by its own language, which
requires implementation only so far as it comports with “other essential
considerations of national policy . . . .” 184 In this regard, the
confidentiality of sensitive information is an “essential consideration of
national policy,” as it protects against unintended risks to the public
health and safety.” 185
Nowhere does NEPA permit elevating
environmental concerns over other important considerations.186
Not only would disclosure of terrorist considerations in an EIS fail
to comply with the purpose of NEPA, but also such disclosure would
contradict the safeguard requirements of the AEA.187 The AEA provides
strict guidance and regulations concerning the control of information
related to the physical protection of plants and materials 188 for the
purpose of protecting “the health and safety of the public and the
common defense.” 189 Publication and distribution of information that
might endanger the public would compromise the purpose of the AEA
and raise NEPA’s environmental concerns above more critical concerns,
in violation of Supreme Court precedent.190
The Weinberger decision properly sets the standard for the
appropriate scope of the EIS. No GWEN and Mothers for Peace
interpreted Weinberger to mean that NEPA provides no national defense
exception, and that particular sensitive elements of an EIS may only
remain private if specifically exempted under FOIA. 191 To some,
because the AEC was required to focus on industrial dangers present to employees and
the neighboring public, and a plant’s security against treachery, negligence, or incapacity,
not on attacks by a foreign enemy—a threat shared by the entire public, not only those
near nuclear facilities).
182 Id. at 784 (“We are unable to find any specific indication, within or without the
corners of the statute, that the Commission was commanded to intrude the possibility of
an enemy action into the concepts of the common defense and security and the public
health and safety.”) (internal quotations omitted).
183 Id. at 783–84.
184 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006).
185 See Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355.
186 Strykers’ Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
187 See 42 U.S.C. § 2167(a) (2006).
188 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.21, 73.22 (2011).
189 42 U.S.C. § 2167(a) (2006).
190 Strykers’ Bay Neighborhood Council, 444 U.S. at 227.
191 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d
1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace
Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 144–45, which addressed two particular exemptions:
express statutory exemption and classification by executive order, and allowing parts of
an EIS that fall under these exemptions to be withheld from publication); No GWEN
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Weinberger may provide the ideal compromise: conduct an extensive
review of the potential environmental impacts of terrorism, but keep that
portion of the EIS confidential. But this compromise fails to satisfy the
twin aims of NEPA: to require the government to fully contemplate
environmental effects and to assure the public that the government has
complied with its administrative requirements. Though an exemption
from FOIA disclosure would still permit development of the EIS behind
closed doors, it would fail a NEPA goal of informing the public that
adequate review has occurred, because the public would have no access
to confidential information conveyed during a closed hearing.192 NEPA
is a dialogue between the government and the public that does not occur
if the government prohibits the public from accessing the information
necessary to participate in this dialogue.
D. A Terrorism Assessment Requirement Would Establish an
Unattainable Standard
Requiring a NEPA terrorism analysis would have two obvious
effects: (1) it would expand the NRC’s NEPA review to a field in which
its actions do not precipitate the environmental effect, and (2) it would
effectively remove any limit on the scope of considerations which an
agency must contemplate as “environmental impacts.”
The NRC is the wrong agency to address the terror issue. Power
plants must follow safety and security procedures,193 just as they must
consider environmental impacts. 194 Plant safety and security efforts
protect against any threat, regardless of whether the threat is labeled
“terrorism.” Likewise, the EIS addresses all likely and probable
environmental impacts of a federal action regardless of any intervening
or superseding incident. A discussion of terrorism in an EIS would serve
Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988). See also
STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 24–25 (1996) (“Congress
was well aware, when it enacted NEPA, that some [EISs] would contain classified
information, and that the public dissemination of that information might endanger the
national security. It addressed that concern by directing that each EIS . . . be made
available to the public ‘as provided by [FOIA], which makes . . . records available to
members of the public for the asking, but which exempts properly classified data from
disclosure.”).
192 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (2011) (permitting agencies to safeguard information from
the public that has been classified by Executive Order by organizing the classified
information as appendices to the EIS). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, hearing Mothers for
Peace on remand, agreed that the NRC is not required to hold a closed hearing and held
that the Commission may rightly use its discretion to determine whether holding a closed
hearing would present unnecessary security risks. San Louis Obispo Mothers for Peace
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 635 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011).
193 10 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2011).
194 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2011).
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no purpose because the NRC can do nothing outside of its own local
security measures to prevent terrorist acts.195 Additionally, because the
environmental effects that would result from a major accident (including
a terrorist attack) are already part of the EIS, specific consideration of
these effects when precipitated by a terrorist act would add nothing new
to the environmental discussion.
To streamline the review process and use resources efficiently,
“[a]gencies are encouraged to tier their environmental impact statements
to eliminate repetitive discussion of the same issues and to focus on the
actual issues ripe for discussion at each level of environmental
review.” 196 The NRC already requires consideration of the release of
radioactive material into the environment.197 Though the law does not
require a “worst case” analysis, this consideration represents, in effect,
the worst possible case.198 Consideration of the release of radioactive
material as a result of an airplane crash would be superfluous. The
Second Circuit illustrated this premise in a 2009 decision, holding that an
EIS that considered the risk of fire at a spent-fuel pool inherently
contemplated acts of terrorism. 199 An additional, terrorism-specific
requirement would be unnecessarily redundant and a waste of limited
agency resources.
The requirement that an EIS contemplate the impacts of terrorism
would remove the boundary between proximate effects of a federal
action and those effects too attenuated to be properly attributed to that
action, due to the ambiguity of the term “terrorism.”
Absent
Metropolitan Edison’s “manageable line,” the scope of the NRC’s NEPA
process is virtually limitless, “subject only to the ingenuity of those
claiming that the agency must evaluate this or that potential adverse
195 See Riverkeeper Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Glass Packaging
v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
196 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2011).
EISs are prepared in two stages. First, the
implementing agency prepares a Draft EIS, which it circulates to other federal agencies
that have jurisdiction or that request to comment, states, Indian tribes, and any interested
private parties. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1. The implementing agency must then address the
issues raised by these parties in the Final EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9. A Supplemental EIS
may be required when the agency changes the action, new circumstances or information
arise, or the purpose of NEPA will be facilitated by doing so. Id.
197 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011).
198 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 351 (2002); RICHARD RHODES,
NUCLEAR RENEWAL: COMMON SENSE ABOUT ENERGY 92 (1993) (“Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl represent extreme instances of the problem that seems to trouble the American
public more than any other about commercial nuclear power: its apparent danger.”).
199 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 554, n.1 (2d Cir.
2009) (stating that the studies on the risk of fires “(including those conducted since
September 2001) consider the risk of fire precipitated by a terrorist attack, and classify
that risk as low.”).
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effect, no matter how indirect its connection to agency action.”200 No
governmental body can ever completely and properly contemplate the
entire breadth of a factor as vague as terrorism, which has so many
varying definitions and manifestations. 201 As more threats are perceived,
the requirement to evaluate the risk and impact of terrorism will grow
larger. Subsequently, the terrorism review will evolve from an analysis
of reasonably foreseeable impacts into an analysis of imaginable risks
and hypothetical effects. Metropolitan Edison and Weinberger expressly
proscribe such analyses.202
E. Possible Compromises
Neither NEPA nor the AEA require or provide an effective legal
mechanism for a terrorism review that would serve the purposes of either
act. The lack of a requirement to consider the threat of terrorism does
not necessarily mean that the NRC should do nothing with respect to the
effect of a terrorist act. Unless the Supreme Court resolves the question
of whether and how NEPA review is to address terrorism, there are
several possibilities that Congress or the NRC might consider in order to
bring the Ninth Circuit and the rest of the country under a common rule
of law.
1. Revive “Worst Case” Scenario Analysis
As an option for addressing terrorism, the NRC could consider
reviving a modified “worst case” scenario analysis. In 1986, the CEQ
removed the requirement that plants consider a “worst case” scenario
from its regulations because “in certain circumstances [it had] been the
impetus for judicial decisions which require federal agencies to go
beyond the ‘rule of reason’ in their analysis of potentially severe
impacts.”203 The CEQ replaced it with the current rule, which requires
an evaluation of reasonably foreseeable impacts based on relevant
scientific evidence and within the rule of reason.204 The NRC does not
perceive a terrorist attack as falling within the rule of reason. Thus, no
200

Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 350.
See e.g., Nicolas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism:
The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 255 (2004) (stating that federal law
provides at least nineteen distinct definitions of the term “terrorism”).
202 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774–76
(1983); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 140
(1981).
203 50 Fed. Reg. 32,234 (proposed Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
1502.22).
204 National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 15, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22).
201
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requirement to address the possible environmental impact of terrorism
within an EIS exists.205
Despite this rule, a limited revival of “worst case” analysis—based
on the actual effects of recent terrorist attacks—might appease both
sides. An outside party, such as Homeland Security or Congress, could
identify from time to time the current worst case threat to nuclear
facilities.206 Based on this independent determination, the NRC would
then require all new licenses going forward, and perhaps even current
licensed facilities, to analyze the impact on the environment if that
possibility were to occur. This option could also solve, or at least
mitigate, the problems arising due to the many definitions and forms of
terrorism.207 The requirement to analyze the environmental impact of a
pre-determined worst case would free the NRC from the burden of trying
to account for an issue as ambiguous as terrorism as well as from the
shortcomings of analyzing only one specific type of terrorism.
Establishing a worst case scenario that would logically encompass other
events of lesser magnitude would serve as a reasonable compromise of
these two extremes.
2. Entrust the Issue of Terrorism Exclusively to Homeland Security
Another problem with an NRC-based terrorism review is the
NRC’s lack of legal authority to combat threats to its facilities beyond
those facilities’ physical boundaries. Numerous actions can potentially
affect nuclear facilities; however, statutes other than NEPA govern these
actions. Merely building a structure that might appeal to a terrorist as a
target does not itself create an environmental effect. NRC safety and
security regulations specifically provide for measures of protection
around facilities, including the number of armed guards and their
weapons training, vehicle stand-off distances, construction of physical
barriers, etc.208 Though the regulations do not require that the structures
be able to withstand sabotage or attacks by enemies of the United
States,209 a recently created rule requires power plants to take every step
205 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2011). The exception to this rule, of course, is that
those nuclear plants in the Ninth Circuit are under the obligation to address terrorism.
206 Cf.,
Threat
Assessment,
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REGULATORY
COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/security/domestic/phys-protect/threat.html#Annual (last visited Oct.
27, 2010).
207 Perry, supra note 201.
208 See NRC Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Cites, 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.40–
73.56 (2011); General Requirements for Security Personnel, 10 C.F.R. pt. 73 app. B
(2011).
209 10 C.F.R. § 52.10 (2011); Power Reactor Safety Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg.
13,926, 13,957 (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73 and 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (Mar. 27, 2009) (“The
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practicable to avoid or mitigate the effect of an aircraft impact. 210
Preparing for a factor as a design-based threat, however, does not give
the NRC the authority or ability to prevent the attack itself—that power
must come from the law.211
The NRC’s responsibilities arising from its AEA mandate are
distinct from what it must contemplate as a “significant environmental
impact” under NEPA. The power and responsibility to prevent, protect,
and mitigate the effects of terrorism belong to other federal agencies.212
The Department of Homeland Security is not only charged with
protecting the United States and responding to terrorist attacks, but it also
possesses the legal authority to take action to prevent terrorist acts from
occurring. 213 Under the proximate causation standard described in
Metropolitan Edison, and Public Citizen’s rule that an EIS need not
address effects which lie beyond the agency’s control, 214 the issue of
terrorism falls decidedly outside the purview of the NRC, and more
appropriately, within that of Homeland Security. Charging the NRC
with the duty of a thorough terrorism review would not only give it a task
outside its delegated authority and practical ability, but also would
encroach on the duties legally charged to Homeland Security and other
agencies.
3. Institute a Homeland Security Impact Statement
Just as NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the effects of
their actions on the human environment and assure the public that all
significant environmental impacts have been considered, 215 a similar
impact of a large aircraft on [a] nuclear power plant is regarded as a beyond-design basis
event.”).
210 Power Reactor Safety Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,926 (Mar. 27, 2009)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73 and 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (amending the requirements for
nuclear plant protection against design-based threats, including the effect of an airliner
impact and requirements for post-impact emergency response; also stating that the NRC’s
aircraft impact rule and the aircraft threat mitigation procedures focus on enhancing a
plant’s ability to withstand commercial aircraft impacts and that the plant operator will be
prepared to combat the fires caused by such an impact); see also Reactor Rule Made with
9/11 in Mind, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A05.
211 See e.g., Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (expressly establishing the
primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security, which includes “prevent[ing]
terrorist attacks within the United States.”).
212 See id.
213 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(C) (2006).
214 Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004); Riverkeeper Inc v.
Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2004); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011).
215 Weinberger v Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 553 (1978).
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requirement that agencies consider the effect of their actions on national
security—taking the form of a Homeland Security Impact Statement
(“HSIS”)—may be in order. 216 Even though the consideration of a
terrorist attack on a power plant would not discuss any environmental
effect that an EIS does not already contemplate,217 the public has a valid
interest in the potentially harmful effects that a nuclear plant could cause
to the security of the nation. Though Congress and the implementing
agency would determine the specific requirements of an HSIS, the HSIS
would theoretically follow a similar procedural formula as an EIS. For
any major federal action, the implementing agency—or Homeland
Security—would determine whether the action, if completed, poses a risk
to national security. The HSIS would examine these risks and advise the
agency and the government on subsequent steps.
Differences between an EIS and the proposed HSIS will likely
arise. Unlike NEPA, Homeland Security does not have a public
disclosure requirement, so it could—and likely would—classify the
HSIS in order to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information. The
HSIS would inform the government, not the public, that the government
has properly considered the terror threat. This non-public process would
force the agency to take a “hard look” at the consequences of its actions
while confining sensitive matters of national security to the appropriate
forum. Such a process would also serve the first aim of NEPA (ensuring
thorough agency review) and may serve the second (public assurance of
thorough agency deliberation) through disclosure to a congressional
committee or an independent government body with security clearance.
An HSIS, like an EIS, would not discuss the possible effect of
terrorism on the environment. The NRC would retain its duty to
contemplate the environmental impact of its nuclear facilities. The
terror-prevention duty would clearly vest in another federal agency,
freeing the NRC of any burden to review potential terror threats and
contemplate a multitude of conduct-specific impacts. The duty to
evaluate the wide range of reasonably foreseeable environmental
impacts, regardless of their independent causes, would therefore remain.
216 See Michael S. Munson, Comment, Averting Nuclear 9/11: The Need to Move
Beyond NEPA and Transition to a Homeland Security-Administered Infrastructure
Security Statement, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 335, 364–66 (2010)
(advocating a nuclear plant security regime managed by the Department of Homeland
Security); Joseph Farris, Comment, Mothers for Peace and the Need to Develop
Classified NEPA Procedures, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 955, 973–74 (2007) (proposing a NEPA
terrorism review through in camera judicial proceedings with a congressional committee
serving as a proxy for the public).
217 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 561 F.3d 132, 143;
10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B (2011).
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4. Broaden the NRC’s Authority and Obligations
A final option, independent of “worst case” analysis or the HSIS,
relates to Public Citizen’s rule that an EIS need not consider effects
which lie outside an agency’s control.218 The NRC does not contemplate
terrorism because it lacks the power to prevent certain large-scale acts
that occur beyond its own premises. Although the NRC is authorized
and equipped to protect the immediate area of its facilities,219 it relies on
the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration to
protect the airspace surrounding these facilities. 220 To some, a radar
tower, no-fly zone, and missile battery may represent reasonable
safeguards that a nuclear facility should employ to protect itself. Such
efforts, however, would exceed the line between the permissible use of
force to stop a criminal act and the excessive use of force to regulate and
intrude upon civilian life far beyond the boundaries of the plant.221
Without the ability to prevent or influence a cause that would
produce a certain environmental effect, that effect cannot be considered
an impact of the construction, licensing, and operation of a power plant.
An extension of the NRC’s authority—to permit it to protect the airspace
surrounding its facilities—could subsequently bring the environmental
effect of terrorist actions into the purview of the NRC. Such an
extension of authority, however, could also transform the NRC into a
paramilitary force. As the law reads today, the extent of the NRC’s
regulatory power does not reach so far; the environmental impacts of
terrorist attacks fall outside the NRC’s reach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until this problem is resolved, the Ninth Circuit will continue to
impose its distinct requirement that EIS statements contain provisions for
the environmental effects of terrorism upon nuclear generating stations
and fuel storage facilities within its jurisdiction. Such a regime will
allow a handful of special interest groups to thwart the efforts of the
NRC, the CEQ, and Congress to provide peaceful and prosperous uses of
nuclear energy. The Supreme Court has the ability to resolve this split,
and should do so by affirming the Third Circuit’s ruling in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection.

218

See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 172.
220 See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (denying
Riverkeeper, Inc.’s petition to establish a no-fly zone around the Indian Point nuclear
plant near New York City and a security system capable of defending that zone).
221 Id.
219
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Barring intervention by the Supreme Court, Congress has the ability
to closely consider the public interest and implement a variety of
mechanisms to address this issue. First, a limited revival of “worst case”
analysis could provide a vehicle for a terrorism review. Second,
Congress could free the NRC of this burden by entrusting terrorism
analysis exclusively to Homeland Security. Third, Congress could
require the agencies or Homeland Security to publish a Homeland
Security Impact Statement. Finally, Congress could broaden the scope of
the NRC’s defensive capabilities and jurisdiction, and expressly charge it
with the duty to evaluate the threat of terrorism. Until either Congress or
the Supreme Court acts, the NRC will continue to enforce its statutory
duty as per its discretion in a manner best serving the nation, while the
Ninth Circuit exposes its energy industry to ambiguous and unattainable
disclosure demands, and its citizens to unnecessary threats.

